Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment (Princeton Monographs in Philosophy)
Galen Strawson
Language: English
Pages: 280
ISBN: 0691161003
Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub
John Locke's theory of personal identity underlies all modern discussion of the nature of persons and selves--yet it is widely thought to be wrong. In this book, Galen Strawson argues that in fact it is Locke's critics who are wrong, and that the famous objections to his theory are invalid. Indeed, far from refuting Locke, they illustrate his fundamental point.
Strawson argues that the root error is to take Locke's use of the word "person" as merely a term for a standard persisting thing, like "human being." In actuality, Locke uses "person" primarily as a forensic or legal term geared specifically to questions about praise and blame, punishment and reward. This point is familiar to some philosophers, but its full consequences have not been worked out, partly because of a further error about what Locke means by the word "conscious." When Locke claims that your personal identity is a matter of the actions that you are conscious of, he means the actions that you experience as your own in some fundamental and immediate manner.
Clearly and vigorously argued, this is an important contribution both to the history of philosophy and to the contemporary philosophy of personal identity.
very dealing” (1941: 330). Note that Gurwitsch’s impersonal formulation “aware of this very dealing” is better—because less open to misinterpretation—than his “aware of my being conscious of [the object],” since the phenomenon in question does not require any thought of oneself as such. This is indeed Gurwitsch’s main point, which he has already made three pages earlier: “the subject in his dealing with the object, aware as he is of this dealing, is nevertheless in no way aware of his ego, much
enough, especially when placed in its mortalist context, but the interpretation of §13 is This is not of course transubstantiation in any magical or Christian sense. 5 Strawson_Locke on Personal Identity_N.indb 100 1/16/14 9:18 AM “but next…” 101 difficult, so I’ll take it sentence by sentence. I hope it will become clearer why it’s useful to distinguish [S] and [A], in discussing Locke’s notion of a Person [P], but those who aren’t interested in the detailed discussion of §13 may now
1/16/14 9:18 AM 104 chapter thirteen Locke Essay Concerning Human Understanding 2.27.13 [s1] But next, as to the first part of the question, whether if the same thinking substance (supposing immaterial substances only to think) be changed, it can be the same person. [s2] I answer, that cannot be resolved, but by those, who know what kind of substances they are, that do think; and whether the consciousness of past actions can be transferred from one thinking substance to another. [s3] I
his claim that “consciousness [alone] makes Personal identity” (§10, §16). I believe this objection is mistaken and consider it in the next chapter.2 Having put this objection aside, I propose that we call a transfer of Consciousness of an action or experience from one Lockean “agent” to another an [Ag]-transfer; a transfer of Consciousness of an action or experience from one immaterial substance to another an [I]-transfer; and a transfer of Consciousness of an action or experience from one
identity or continuity of any substance, although causal continuity is presumably required; (2) what such a thing is responsible for, at any given time, is the set of actions and experiences it is Conscious of, at that time. The unfortunate [Sx] helps us to think further about the general issue (even though we have no reason to think any such case occurred to Locke), for our natural reaction to [Sx] expresses an aspect of our concept of a person that Locke takes for granted in his overall theory,