A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, 4th Edition
John Losee
Language: English
Pages: 328
ISBN: 0198700555
Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub
Designed for first-time readers of the subject, this stimulating introduction offers a historical exposition of differing views on the philosophy of science. With concise profiles presenting the major philosophers whose contributions are discussed in this book, Losee explores the long-argued questions raised by philosophers and scientists about the proper evaluation of science. This new edition incorporates contemporary developments in the discipline, including recent work on theory-appraisal, experimental practice, the debate over scientific realism, and the philosophy of biology. Taking a balanced and informative approach, this work is the ideal introductory volume.
attributed to “unimportant” experimental complications. As noted above, Galileo sometimes took recourse to this approach. However, a more important aspect of Galileo’s Archimedean–Platonic commitment was his emphasis on the value of abstraction and idealization in science. This was the converse side, as it were, of his willingness to explain away discrepancies between theory and observation. It was stressed above that much of Galileo’s success in physics may be attributed to his ability to
relations. Upon occasion, Mill extolled all four of his inductive schemata as rules of proof of causal connection. In his more cautious moments, however, he restricted the proof of causal connection to those arguments which satisfy the Method of Difference. Justification of Induction. In order to establish that any argument which has the form of the Method of Difference proves causal connection, Mill would have to show that the connection is both invariable and unconditional. Mill believed that he
or refutation by empirical evidence. In Poincaré’s formulation, the “generalized inertial principle” specifies that the acceleration of a body depends only on its position, and on the positions and velocities of neighbouring bodies.9 Poincaré observed that a decisive test of this principle would require that, after a certain period of time, each body in the universe reassume the position and velocity it had had at some particular earlier time. But such a test cannot be made. The most that can be
complex indeed. One of Bridgman’s examples is the concept of stress within a deformed elastic body. Stress cannot be measured directly, but it can be calculated by means of a mathematical theory from measurements made on the surface of the body. Thus, for the concept stress, the operations performed include “paper and pencil” operations. No matter. Given the formal * ‘For all cases, if operations O are performed, then concept C applies if, and only if, results R occur.’ logical
n) and is green, or x is not identical with (a ∨ b ∨ c ∨ . . . n) and is blue.’ On this definition of “grue”, it still is true that each individual which is a positive instance of generalization ‘()’ also is a positive instance of generalization ‘()’.* Goodman maintained that the way to overcome the difficulties associated with predicates like ‘grue’ and ‘men now in this room’ is to take a pragmatic–historical approach. One should begin with the record of past usage of predicates, and use this