War by Timetable: How the First World War Began
A J P Taylor
Language: English
Pages: 128
ISBN: B00DIDASXA
Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub
'The First World War had begun - imposed on the statesmen of Europe by railway timetables. It was an unexpected climax to the railway age.'
A. J. P. Taylor was one of the most acclaimed historians of the twentieth century.
His most provocative legacy was his insistence on the roles of accident and inadvertence in the outbreak of both world wars.
First published in 1969, his book 'War by Timetable' still resonates and informs debates.
'War By Timetable' is a history of the mobilisation of the armies of the Great Powers in 1914. Taylor not only argues that the circumstances were already set for a general war, he also examines the flaws in the war plans of the Great Powers.
All the plans depended on railways, which had been timed to the minute, months or even years in advance. As the train platforms grew longer (to accommodate prospective armies) the odds upon a great conflict grew shorter.
The timetables and limited resources that were meant to serve as a deterrent to war instead relentlessly drove the powers into a conflict that engulfed the world.
'War By Timetable' is one of the finest history books ever written, a must read for anyone interested in the origins of the First World War.
Taylor's work has been widely praised:
" A.J. P Taylor's 'war by timetable thesis' caused great controversy when it first appeared over 40 years ago. It remains hugely controversial, today, and is essential reading for anyone interested in the debate on the origins on the First World War"' - Professor Gary Sheffield, author 'Forgotten Victories'.
'A miracle of proportion, language and insight' - Robert Skidelsky
'A dazzling exercise in revisionism which summed up Taylor's paradoxical, provocative and inventive approach to history' - The Times
'Taylor was a lifelong dissenter ... he shifted the ground of major debates' - Ben Pimlott, The Financial Times
'No historian of the past century has been more accessible.' - Niall Ferguson, The Sunday Telegraph
'An almost faultless masterpiece' - The Observer
'Highly original and penetrating ... No one who has digested this enthralling work will ever be able to look at the period again in quite the same way'
- The Sunday Telegraph
A.J.P. Taylor (1906-90) was one of the most controversial historians of the twentieth century. He served as a lecturer at the Universities of Manchester, Oxford, and London. Taylor was significant both for the controversy his work on Germany and the Second World War engendered and for his role in the development of history on television.
Endeavour Press is the UK's leading independent publisher of digital books.
time-tables dictated that there must be full mobilisation or nothing. Finally Berchtold consulted Tisza, prime minister of Hungary and the most forceful character in the monarchy. Tisza disliked the Serbs, but he did not fear them. He was much more fearful that a successful action against the Serbs would restore Habsburg prestige, to Hungary's disadvantage. He insisted that action should be taken only if Germany approved. This suited Berchtold. He could demonstrate to his ally that
Serbia would yield at some point, preferably after a war. He was also committed to the doctrine that Russia would not intervene, if faced with the threat of war with Germany. He had laid down this doctrine on 5th July. He continued to hold it on 28th July. He had virtually no choice. For if Russia failed to back down, what happened to the belief in Germany's strong right arm? What would be said by all the patriotic Germans who had been told for a generation that their army was the most powerful
know how quickly the Fatherland could go to war. Moltke, for his part, was bewitched by the time-table which he had inherited from Schlieffen. He was convinced that, once Russia started to mobilise, Germany could not waste a day. Yet he knew that Russian mobilisation would lurch along for many weeks and that Germany had plenty of time in hand. Instead he sounded the alarm of French mobilisation, which had, in fact, not yet started. Even this alarm was misplaced. For the object of the Schlieffen
war, as alleged in the Treaty of Versailles. Many English and American scholars came to agree with them, in a perverse Anglo-Saxon way. The actual course of events seemed too childishly simple, and the explanations disappointingly crude. It was expected that, if more were known, more would be found out -an expression of the usual modern illusion that knowledge leads to understanding. The statesmen wrote their memoirs. The foreign ministries opened their archives or rather allowed scholars of
insisted that a considerable proportion of the Russian army should be directed against Germany. The Russians willingly produced fanciful figures showing the vast armies available for the German theatre. They were less forthcoming in the practical consideration of building strategic railways to the German frontier. Time and again, the French provided loans to Russia, on condition that part of the money should be spent on such railways. Time and again, the condition was evaded. The Russian