The Event (Studies in Continental Thought)

The Event (Studies in Continental Thought)

Martin Heidegger

Language: English

Pages: 336


Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub

Martin Heidegger’s The Event offers his most substantial self-critique of his Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event and articulates what he means by the event itself. Richard Rojcewicz’s elegant translation offers the English-speaking reader intimate contact with one of the most basic Heideggerian concepts. This book lays out how the event is to be understood and ties it closely to looking, showing, self-manifestation, and the self-unveiling of the gods. The Event (Complete Works, volume 71) is part of a series of Heidegger's private writings in response to Contributions.













decisive for the characterization of language in the sense of the founding of being is precisely the relation to being. And! “being” is meant here as what is worthy of question (cf. Grundbegriffe, s. s. 41 {GA51}). Poetizing and thinking—their “relationship” cannot be established through a “timelessly” valid rule; since they themselves fundamentally ground the historicity of the history of the human being, they are historical in the original sense (sending a destiny; ordaining as dispensing).

thinking—as a questioning of that which is worthy of question. * The differentiation of poetizing and thinking is above all a segregative separation of what is purely and simply distinct. But this differentiation separates because it distinguishes something original such that the separated things are determined to an essence out of which, in a respectively different way, each thinks, and poetizes, over to the other. The thinking of beyng is by way of poetizing. The poetizing of the holy is a

to willing is that which underlies itself as the ground of itself; i.e., it is the subject. Calculative objectification can uncover for itself only ordering as a goal (intention), an ordering that secures the progression of the objectification only as the basis for “more” willing, i.e., for ever less of that which does not undergo objectification and could emerge out of itself. The dominance of the will to willing, however, does in no way bring being itself into the truth; it deals only with

act of onlooking, whereby the onlooking does nevertheless not posit and create the ἰδέα but, instead, perceives it. Yet this indeed seems to have been said already, in the dictum of Parmenides which refers to νοεν in its belonging to being. Is εναι not here already νοούμενον, thus ἰδέα? Precisely not; precisely that step lies far off. Instead, νοεν and εναι are named in their belonging to ἀλήθεια. And this is essentially different from the coupling of ἀλήθεια and νος under the yoke of the ἰδέα.

the consonance. 276. The beginning—inexperience7 We are equally inexperienced, or indeed totally without experience, as regards both the first beginning and the other beginning, which in fact are not two different beginnings but, rather, one and the same beginning in each and every inceptuality. For we do not know the difference, and we do not surmise the departure. We are not a match for the downgoing and consider it merely an end and a collapse. We are inexperienced, “painless,” as regards

Download sample