The Chief: Douglas Haig and the British Army
Language: English
Pages: 400
ISBN: 1845137698
Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub
‘Well written and persuasive …objective and well-rounded….this scholarly rehabilitation should be the standard biography’ **** Andrew Roberts, Mail on Sunday
‘A true judgment of him must lie somewhere between hero and zero, and in this detailed biography Gary Sheffield shows himself well qualified to make it … a balanced portrait’ Sunday Times
‘Solid scholarship and admirable advocacy’ Sunday Telegraph
Douglas Haig is the single most controversial general in British history. In 1918, after his armies had won the First World War, he was feted as a saviour. But within twenty years his reputation was in ruins, and it has never recovered. In this fascinating biography, Professor Gary Sheffield reassesses Haig’s reputation, assessing his critical role in preparing the army for war.
‘a frequent review of the results’, and the offensive was to be halted if the casualties outweighed the advantages. Who would do the assessing – Haig, or the War Cabinet? It just was not clear.34 Haig entered upon his great Flanders offensive aware that political support was shaky and dependant on results. But he was convinced his army could do great things. After returning from London Haig spent much of his time doing something rather more to his taste, visiting his army. On a visit to 8th
breaking the Drocourt–Quéant (D-Q) Line and reaching the line of the Canal du Nord, and it was then to ‘sweep down behind the Hindenburg Line’ where it would fall on the right flank of the forces opposing Third Army.61 In essence, having pushed the Germans hard in the south, Haig wanted to unbalance them by switching the point of attack to the north. Accordingly, on 25 August he turned down Rawlinson’s request for reinforcements, saying ‘the decisive point was the Arras–Cambrai road’. Haig hoped
the limit, and Monash and his commanders, in Peter Stanley’s words ‘barely kept up with a fast-moving battle’. But it worked: 2nd Australian Division’s capture of Mont-Saint-Quentin was, to Rawlinson, ‘a magnificent performance’. Péronne was captured by the evening of 2 September, and III Corps was able to move up in support.68 The shock waves from this battle were far-reaching.69 The Australians drove a wedge into the line along the Somme that Ludendorff had hoped to hold over the winter. Now,
bayonet’ and without a preliminary bombardment. It was agreed to opt for a dawn assault with artillery preparation to attempt to eliminate the all-important German machine-guns.68 This too was cancelled as the scale of the British casualties, the shortage of ammunition and the poor state of the artillery became clear. Haig’s summary of the situation at dawn makes depressing reading. It indicated a sense of realism about the limitation of the forces at his disposal, and the need to undertake ‘more
with Joffre and Foch (whom Joffre shortly was to task with co-ordinating the battle) on 3 July, Fourth Army issued orders to attack the German Second Position between Longueval and Bazentin le Petit. In preparation for the assault, Rawlinson was to capture a good jumping-off position for the attack. Gough’s Reserve Army would play a secondary role in fixing German forces on its front.36 Fourth Army thus did begin to build up force on the right, but it was a case of too little, too late. By 4 July