Free Will
Joseph Keim Campbell
Language: English
Pages: 136
ISBN: 0745646670
Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub
What is free will? Why is it important? Can the same act be both free and determined? Is free will necessary for moral responsibility? Does anyone have free will, and if not, how is creativity possible and how can anyone be praised or blamed for anything?
These are just some of the questions considered by Joseph Keim Campbell in this lively and accessible introduction to the concept of free will. Using a range of engaging examples the book introduces the problems, arguments, and theories surrounding free will. Beginning with a discussion of fatalism and causal determinism, the book goes on to focus on the metaphysics of moral responsibility, free will skepticism, and skepticism about moral responsibility. Campbell shows that no matter how we look at it, free will is problematic. Thankfully there are a plethora of solutions on offer and the best of these are considered in full in the final chapter on contemporary theories of free will. This includes a rigorous account of libertarianism, compatabilism, and naturalism.
Free Will is the ideal introduction to the topic and will be a valuable resource for scholars and students seeking to understand the importance and relevance of the concept for contemporary philosophy.
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inference rule (S), so the argument is not sound. The argument might be repaired with a new and better inference rule. And this would be worth discussing were it not for the fact that there is a better version of the consequence argument available, the third argument (1983, 93–104, 1989 and 2000). 3.2 The Third Argument In the third argument, van Inwagen employs the N-operator, where “Np” stands for “p and no one has, or ever had, any choice about whether p” (1989, 404). For our purposes, one
render any true proposition false. Let P0 be any true proposition about the remote past, that is the time “before there were any human beings” (1989, 224; Finch and Warfield 1998). Let L and P be as above. Here is the third argument (1983, 93–104; 1989, 404–405; 2000). (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) ᮀ((P0 & L) → P) ᮀ (P0 → (L → P)) N(P0 → (L → P)) N(P0) N(L → P) N(L) N(P) assumption of determinism from (1) by exportation from (2) by (α) assumption from (3), (4) by (β) assumption from (5), (6) by
is or was able to do otherwise (§ 2.2). See below. Thanks to Bob Kane. Compatibilism and incompatibilism are, by definition, contradictories: if one is true, the other is false. Honderich questions this taxonomy and suggests that compatibilism and 108 Notes to pp. 84–102 incompatibilism are contraries: they can’t both be true but they can both be false. 5 Thanks to Saul Smilansky. 6 Moore uses the term “can” or its cognates but it turns out that “can” is ambiguous in ways that Moore did not
From Nature to Illusion.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101: 71–95. ———. Forthcoming. “Free Will: Some Bad News.” In Campbell, O’Rourke, and Silverstein forthcoming-a. Smith, Barry. 1999. “Truthmaker Realism.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77: 274–291. Sommers, Tamler. 2007. “The Objective Attitude.” The Philosophical Quarterly. Spinoza, Benedict (or Baruch). 1677. Ethics Demonstrated in Geometrical Order. From Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Jonathan Bennett.