Aristotle's Cognitive Science: Belief, Affect and Rationality
Ian McCready-Flora
Language: English
Pages: 42
ISBN: 2:00178257
Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub
I offer a novel interpretation of Aristotle’s psychology and notion of rationality, which
draws the line between animal and specifically human cognition. Aristotle distinguishes
belief (doxa), a form of rational cognition, from imagining (phantasia), which is shared
with non-rational animals. We are, he says,“immediately affected” by beliefs, but
respond to imagining “as if we were looking at a picture.” Aristotle’s argument has
been misunderstood; my interpretation explains and motivates it. Rationality includes a
filter that interrupts the pathways between cognition and behavior. This prevents the
subject from responding to certain representations. Stress and damage compromise the
filter, making the subject respond indiscriminately, as non-rational animals do. Beliefs
are representations that have made it past the filter, which is why they can “affect [us]
immediately.” Aristotle’s claims express ceteris paribus generalizations, subject to
exceptions. No list of provisos could turn them into non-vacuous universal claims, but
this does not rob them of their explanatory power. Aristotle’s cognitive science resolves
a tension we grapple with today: it accounts for the specialness of human action and
thinking within a strictly naturalistic framework. The theory is striking in its insight and
explanatory power, instructive in its methodological shortcomings
fearless in the face of an occurrent belief that something is scary. Bravery may demand a little fear, or even a great deal, if something really important is at stake. Fearlessness in those circumstances suggests rashness, not bravery. Nor does lacking a brave soul remove every barrier to the fear response, since someone can exemplify bravery (which entails experiencing modulated fear response) without being fully habituated. Exceptions and adjustments would therefore outrun any finite proviso,
initial questions. This completes my reading of the argument. V. Rationality, Restraint and Modularity We should next ask why Aristotle would claim such a distinction between belief and imagination. Aristotle does not argue for his underlying views in our crucial passage; his purpose there is to merely distinguish belief and imagination. For that, he just needs to point to something true about belief but not imagination. This does not, however, mean that Aristotle has no ARISTOTLE’S COGNITIVE
the imaginings cause affect as real events do, not as fictions do. A person whose reason is occluded lacks the ability to draw that distinction. 66 On Dreams 2, 460b9–17: sὸm aὐsὸm dὲ sqόpοm jaὶ ἐm ὀqcaῖς jaὶ ἐm pάraις ἐpιhυlίaις eὐapάsgsοι cίmοmsaι pάmseς, jaὶ lᾶkkοm ὅrῳ ἂm lᾶkkοm ἐm sοῖς pάherιm ὦrιm. dιὸ jaὶ sοῖς pυqέssουrιm ἐmίοse φaίmesaι fῷa ἐm sοῖς sοίvοις ἀpὸ lιjqᾶς ὁlοιόsgsος sῶm cqallῶm rυmsιhelέmxm. jaὶ saῦs’ ἐmίοse rυmepιseίmeι sοῖς pάherιm οὕsxς, ὥrse, ἂm lὲm lὴ rφόdqa jάlmxrι, lὴ
“seeing-as.” This view has come under suspicion (see for instance Veloso 2004), and it does not seem true in general, but for qualities such as “pleasant” and “painful” it seems correct. Animals are clearly capable of representing things as pleasant or painful, and communicating this representation to other animals: see Politics 1.2, 1253a10–14 and On the Soul 3.13, 435b25–26. Neither ‘pleasant’ nor ‘painful’ is a sensory quality, so the representation is not due to perception alone, but rather
have just said “we are affected accordingly,” but he did not. Furthermore, there are circumstances where imagining does affect humans. This is relevant to Aristotle’s view of RATIONAL cognition, so I will postpone the details until Section 5. For now, we should be suspicious that the interpretation rests on a false assumption. The last reason for doubt is also proleptic: it depends on material that we consider in Section 3. When Aristotle defines fear in the Rhetoric, he says that it results from